The removal of Bangladesh's Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina has unsettled the delicate balance she maintained among India, China, and the United States. India, which leveraged its close ties with Hasina to curb Chinese influence in Bangladesh, stands to lose the most from this shift. In contrast, China may seize this opportunity to expand its foothold in the Bay of Bengal region. Hasina’s diplomatic strategy involved balancing the interests of the three major powers, enabling Bangladesh to secure concessions while avoiding excessive reliance or interference in its internal affairs.

Her departure on August 5 has significant implications for India. New Delhi views China’s increasing involvement in Bangladesh’s infrastructure projects as a strategic threat. For instance, in 2016, India successfully persuaded Dhaka to cancel the Sonadia deep-water port project backed by China. India also fears potential revisions to trans-shipment agreements with Bangladesh, which are crucial for connectivity to India’s northeast. Hasina’s return to power in 2008, facilitated by Indian support, marked a period of close cooperation between the two nations. This era saw enhanced ties in trade, energy, infrastructure, defence, and border security. Under her leadership, Bangladesh enforced stricter border controls and curtailed the activities of terrorist groups with links to Pakistan. However, her increasingly authoritarian rule and political alignment with India sparked growing opposition domestically, culminating in the “India-out” campaign of March 2024. The January 2024 election, marred by an opposition boycott and a record-low voter turnout of 40 percent, further intensified this discontent, forcing India to reconsider its approach to its eastern neighbor.

China, on the other hand, emerged as a major beneficiary during Hasina’s tenure. Perceived as politically neutral, China enjoys a positive image in Bangladesh. By late 2023, over 700 Chinese companies were operating in the country. During Hasina’s visit to Beijing in July 2024, the two nations upgraded their relationship to a “comprehensive strategic cooperative partnership.” China is now Bangladesh’s primary arms supplier, accounting for 73.6 percent of its arms imports from 2010 to 2020. Additionally, China has made significant investments in Bangladesh’s defence infrastructure, including the construction of a submarine base in Cox’s Bazar.

While China’s military cooperation with Bangladesh is still less extensive than India’s, recent developments, such as the first-ever bilateral military exercise in May 2024, indicate growing operational ties. This marks a notable shift from a decade ago when such proximity was unimaginable. Meanwhile, the United States could capitalize on recent tensions between Dhaka and Washington. US sanctions against Bangladesh’s Rapid Action Battalion for human rights violations and demands for adherence to democratic principles align with the grievances of Bangladeshi protesters during the recent uprising. The US, as Bangladesh’s largest export market, continues to maintain defence cooperation with Dhaka. However, Washington must tread carefully, as pushing Bangladesh too hard could drive it closer to Beijing.

The foreign policy direction of Bangladesh will largely depend on the composition of its new government. The resurgence of Islamist forces, such as the Jamaat-e-Islami, which Hasina had repressed, could pose challenges for both India and the United States. A government with Islamist influence might lean toward Pakistan, disrupting the regional strategic equilibrium and complicating US efforts to counter China’s influence. For now, the geopolitical implications of Hasina’s removal remain uncertain. However, her absence signals a potential realignment in South Asia, with significant consequences for India, China, and the United States.

Disclaimer: This image is taken from Reuters.